COMMENTARY
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR RESNICK WILL THIS VEHICLE
PASS INSPECTION?
S. ELIZABETH GIBSONt
INTRODUCTION
Raising the topic of bankruptcy in the midst of a symposium on
any nonbankruptcy topic tends to put a damper on things. It is a little
bit like trying to sell life insurance at a wedding: Why spoil the fun of
discussing intellectual property law, family law, environmental law, or
you-name-it by raising the specter of a distressed debtor's resort to
that murky realm of the federal courts? Fortunately, the organizers of
this Symposium wisely chose to include among the topics for discussion the consideration of bankruptcy as a tool for resolving mass torts.
Perhaps its inclusion comes more naturally to this Symposium than to
others, since a discussion of mass torts necessarily devotes itself to a
crisis situation. Moreover, given the increasing number of companies
that have pursued a bankruptcy reorganization solution to their mass
tort problems,1 a symposium focusing on the current realities presented by mass tort litigation and seeking better means of resolving
2
such cases could not reasonably omit consideration of the topic.
Professor Resnick makes a good case for accepting bankruptcy as

t Burton Craige Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I
gratefully acknowledge the invaluable research and collaborative assistance provided
by Matthew C. Stiegler.
See, e.g., Lindsey v. O'Brien, Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers of
Conn. (In reDow Coming Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 1996);In re UNR Indus.,
Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 767-68 (7th Cir. 1994); In reAmatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1035 (3d
Cir. 1985); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 256 (S.D. Ohio 1996); In re A.H.
Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 743-45 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd 880 F.2d 694, 696-97 (4th Cir.
1989); In reJohns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
2

Cf ADvIsORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES AND WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS,

REPORT ON MASS TORT LI1GATION 58-60 (Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON

MASS TORT LITIGATION] (discussing possible bankruptcy solutions to mass tort problem).

3 Unless otherwise indicated, I use the term "bankruptcy" throughout this corn-
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an appropriate vehicle for resolving what he calls "enterprisethreatening" mass tort liability.4 Among other things, he points out
the procedural and jurisdictional advantages of bankruptcy that permit the consolidation and binding resolution of all pending and future tort claims against the debtor. He then advocates statutory
changes to clarify existing uncertainties concerning bankruptcy's
treatment of mass tort claims and to bolster bankruptcy courts'
authority to achieve a "lasting and global peace" of a corporate
debtor's mass tort liability.5 I am in basic agreement with these two
main points of Professor Resnick's article. I agree that bankruptcy is
an appropriate tool for resolving mass tort claims asserted against certain defendants and that improvements should be sought to make
bankruptcy a more effective mass tort resolution method. I fear, however, that Professor Resnick has overstated the case for bankruptcy in
certain respects, and so I address constitutional concerns raised in
certain mass tort contexts which a bankruptcy resolution may not be
able to ignore.
Even those who have not heretofore embraced the idea that bankruptcy is an appropriate vehicle for resolving mass torts may now be
forced to consider such a possibility, given the obstacles that the Supreme Court has recently placed in the way of two other collective
resolution devices. The Court's first product liability mass tort decision, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,6 rejected a Rule 23(b) (3) class
certification that was sought to achieve a global settlement affecting
"hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals" either currently or possibly in the future possessing asbestos-related claims
against one or more of twenty companies. In so ruling, the Court
identified certification problems in that case that may exist for many
attempted mass tort settlementss and for which the necessary solutions
mentary to refer to bankruptcy reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (1994).
4 Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a VehiceforResolvngEnterpise-ThreateningMass Tort
Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045 (2000).
Id. at 2067.
521 U.S. 591 (1997).
7 Id. at 597.
8 See id. at 624 (holding that Rule 23(b) (3)'s requirement that "[common] questions of law or fact predominate" was not satisfied due to the overarching significance
of questions "peculiar to the several categories of class members, and to individuals
within each category"); id. at 626-27 (holding that Rule 23(a) (4)'s adequacy of representation requirement was not met due to lack of alignment of class members' interests and absence of "structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the
diverse groups and individuals affected"); id. at 628 (questioning whether constitutionally adequate notice "could ever be given to legions so unselfconscious and amor-
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are likely to make Rule 23 (b) (3) settlements less attractive as a mass
tort remedy.9 More recently, in Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp., 10 the Court reversed the certification of a Rule 23(b) (1) (B) class action settlement
based on the class's failure to satisfy requirements that the Court de12
rived from a historically based model 1 of limited fund class actions.
The Court not only imposed requirements for limited fund class actions that may be difficult to meet,13 but also pointedly questioned on

several occasions, without resolving, whether a mandatory Rule
23(b) (1) (B) class action may ever be appropriately certified in the
case of a mass tort.1 4 While Amchem and Ortiz may not sound the death
phous" as the class members who had not manifested any asbestos-related injuries and
their future spouses and children).
9 See REPORT ON MASS TORT ITIGATION, supra note 2, at 41 ("[C]ertifying and settling a large class action under Rule 23(b) (3) for global peace may be more difficult
after Amchem and may be unachievable for future claimants.");John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation AfterAmchem Products-Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent
to Give Away Their Clients' Money, 84 VA. L. REV. 1541, 1552-53 (1998) (discussing one
possible reading of Amchem as requiring the "balkaniz[ation of] the class into an unmanageable assortment of small subclasses that cannot easily act in concert"); Eric D.
Green, What Will We Do When AdjudicationEnds? We'll Settle in Bunches: BringingRule 23
into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1773, 1778 (1997) ("[I]t is apparent that
few, if any, mass tort classes (especially those involving exposure-only victims), could
meet the [Amchem] majority's interpretation of Rule 23(b) (3)'s predominance test or
Rule 23(a) (4)'s adequacy of representation test, for either class action settlement or
trial.").
10 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
n See id. at 2309-12 (identifying the characteristics of traditional limited fund suits);
id. at 2313 (noting that "the greater the leniency in departing from the historical limited fund model, the greater the likelihood of abuse" and "[t]he prudent course,
therefore, is to presume that... the object [of Rule 23(b) (1) (B)] was to stay close to
the historical model").
12The Court held that a limited fund mass tort settlement class must satisfy the following requirements to be certified, and that the class before it had failed to do so:
[I] t would be essential that the fund be shown to be limited independently of
the agreement of the parties to the action, and equally essential under Rule
23(a) and (b) (1) (B) that the class include all those with claims unsatisfied at
the time of the settlement negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by
recognizing independently represented subclasses.
Id. at 2323.
15 See Matthew C. Stiegler, Note, Ortiz and the Future of Limited Fund Settlement Class
Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 78 N.C. L. Rav. 856, 900 (2000) ("Ortiz has made limited
fund class certification substantially, perhaps prohibitively, more difficult and uncertain.").
14See Oftiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2312 ("[We cannot... decide the ultimate question
whether settlements of multitudes of related tort actions are amenable to mandatory
class treatment...."); id. at 2314 ("We do not, it is true, decide the ultimate question
whether Rule 23(b) (1) (B) may ever be used to aggregate individual tort claims." (citation omitted)); id. at 2323 ("In sum, the applicability of Rule 23(b) (1) (B) to a fund
and plan purporting to liquidate actual and potential tort claims is subject to question
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knell for mass tort class action settlements, 5 the decisions certainly increase the difficulty of getting either type of class action certified by a
district court and ultimately approved on appeal.
It is to be expected, therefore, that parties seeking a global resolution of mass tort
litigation may look elsewhere for a solution. 7
Bankruptcy provides such a possible solution-at least until the
Supreme Court decides to take and resolve a mass tort case that raises
the issue whether bankruptcy may be used as a global resolution vehicle."8 Companies overwhelmed by the costs of defending and satisfy...

.");

id. (emphasizing that in holding the settlement class invalid for failure to com-

port with the attributes of limited fund class actions, the Court "[a]ssum[ed] arguendo
that a mandatory, limited fund rationale could under some circumstances be applied
to a settlement class of tort claimants").
"5 See id. at 2822 ("[We have not ruled out the possibility under the present Rule
of a mandatory class to deal with mass tort litigation on a limited fund rationale .... ");
Coffee, supra note 9, at 1559 ("[T]here is a variety of feasible alternatives by which
Amehemn Productsmight be implemented.... Amchem Productswill in time require fairer
rules, but the inquiry has only begun as how to best implement its holdings and its philosophy.").
16 See, for example, Wish v. Interneuron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (In re Diet Drugs
(Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. MDL 1203,
CIV.A.98-20594, 1999 WL 782560 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1999), in which the court stated:
While this court does not read Ortiz as a bar to limited fund class certification
in all mass tort cases, Ortiz does counsel against those .class certifications
which would deprive the class of the protections available under the traditional model. For that reason, the court denies the motion for class certification.
Id. at *14. See, e.g., Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226, 233 (S.D.W. Va.
1997) ("Intervenor... has demonstrated adequately why certification, under either
Rules 23(b) (1) (B) or (b) (3) cannot occur on these facts after Amchem. Accordingly,
the Court (1) ... WITHDRAWS its preliminary approval and certification of the settiement and settlement class; and (2) DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for class certification."
(emphasis omitted)).
17 See, e.g., Richard B. Schmitt & Laura Johannes,Judge Rejects Intneuron
s Proposed
Class-Action Settlement Over Diet Pill WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1999, at B15 (speculating
about possible bankruptcy filing by diet pill manufacturer after district court rejection
of its proposed limited fund class action settlement).
'8 To date, the Supreme Court has not granted review in a mass tort bankruptcy
case. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Tort Claimants v. Dow Coming Corp., 522 U.S. 977
(1997) (denying certiorari in breast implant bankruptcy); Official Comm. of Tort
Claimants v. Dow Coming Corp., 519 U.S. 1071 (1997) (same); UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 513 U.S. 999 (1994) (denying certiorari in
asbestos bankruptcy); Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989) (denying certiorari in Dalkon Shield bankruptcy). Furthermore, significant procedural obstacles may stand in the way of Supreme Court review of the confirmation of a mass
tort bankruptcy reorganization plan. By the time a challenge to a plan would be able
to work its way up to the Supreme Court, it is likely that the plan would have been implemented to such a degree that review would be impracticable or futile. See, e.g., In re
UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's dismissal
of appeal because, although the appeal was not legally moot, the plan's trust provisions
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ing the claims of thousands of tort claimants have in the past and will
continue in the future to seek bankruptcy relief.9 Accordingly,
whether or not bankruptcy is the preferred solution, attention needs
to be paid to how it can be made more effective as a resolution vehicle
for mass torts, and one that is constitutionally sound in all respects.
I. ADVANTAGES OF BANKRUPTCYFOR RESOLVING MASS TORTS
Professor Resnick has discussed a number of features of the bankruptcy system that make it an appropriate vehicle for resolving the
mass tort litigation facing a bankruptcy debtor. The chief advantage is
that bankruptcy, because it demands an all-encompassing financial solution, provides the best conceptual fit for the global resolution of enterprise-threatening mass tort liability. When a company faces massive
tort liability that threatens the viability of the company, it is not just a
problem for the tort claimants and the company's management. It is
a problem affecting all who have a financial relationship with the
company, including other creditors, shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, officers, and directors. As Professor Resnick correctly points out, bankruptcy is the only resolution mechanism that
makes the holders of all of those claims and interests come to the table and thereby come to grips with the problem facing the company.
By staying other means of collecting debts and receiving property
from the debtor, bankruptcy consolidates all financial claims against
the debtor-not just those based on tort law-and then allows the
various constituencies to participate in attempting to arrive at an equi21
table solution for all concerned parties.
Bankruptcy's all-inclusive approach stands in contrast to the resolution of mass torts by means of limited fund class action settlements.2
were too far implemented to be disturbed); Rochman v. Northeast Utils. Serv. Group
(In re Public Serv. Co. of N.H.), 963 F.2d 469, 476 (1st Cir. 1992) (dismissing appeal
from plan confirmation on the ground that "the absence of a stay pending the appeal
of the order confirming the reorganization plan permitted its implementation to so
substantial an extent as to leave the court powerless to grant fair and effective relief").
'9 See, e-g., supra note 1 (listing cases of mass tort defendants seeking bankruptcy
relief).
SeeTHOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANiKRupcY LAw 17 (1986)

(explaining that bankruptcy is both collective and compulsory and stating that it "provides a way to override the creditors' pursuit of their own remedies and to make them
work together"); CHARLESJORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 5 (1997) (describing bankruptcy as "a compulsory collective remedy"); id.at 8 (noting that a "chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganization contains both a stay provision ... and a rule binding dissenters to the terms of the plan agreed to by the bulk of creditors").
21The contrast with Rule 23(b)(3) class action settlements is even more pro-
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The theory underlying the certification under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) of a
mandatory class of tort claimants is that without such consolidation
those who are among the first to sue and recover will deplete the
company's assets, leaving nothing for those who seek recovery at a
later time.2 Thus, in order to prevent the impairment of the latecomers' interests, all potential tort claimants are brought together in
one proceeding, and the limited assets that the defendant company
offers are divided equitably among them.2
The problem, however, with this theory is that if the allegedly insufficient fund is the company itself, rather than a finite fund to which
only a discrete group has a claim, 4 then the tort claimants are not the
only ones competing for the scarce resources. All of the unsecured
creditors have a claim to the unencumbered assets-and the shareholders to any remaining balance-and likewise all should be forced,
in Professor Resnick's words, to "share the pain. " 25 Limited fund class
action settlements of mass torts, however, do not operate in this man-

nounced, since potential members of the class are allowed to opt out in that type of
class action. See FED. R.Civ. P. 23(c) (2)-(3) (providing that potential members of a
23(b) (3) class may request exclusion and that those who do so will not be bound by
thejudgment). Thus, it is likely that not even all tort claimants will be included within
the class action resolution.
22 See, e.g., Fanning v. Acromed Corp. (In re Orthopedic
Bone Screw Prods. Liab.
Litig.), 176 F.R.D. 158, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("AcroMed's net assets and insurance coverage are vastly insufficient to satisfy the many claims against them. Additionally... [a]fter incurring... defense costs, AcroMed would have had little or no ability
to pay settlements or judgments to plaintiffs in individual cases."); Butler v. Mentor
Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. CV 93-P-11433-S, CV
92-P-10000-S, MDL No. 926, 1993 WL 795477, at *5 (N.D. Ala. June 2, 1993) (basing
preliminary certification decision on the "risk that defense costs, individual settlements, or a few judgments would exhaust the Mentor Defendants' assets before other
claimants, with similar claims, had an opportunity to be heard").
" See OrthopedicBone Screw, 176 F.RD. at 177 ("This settlement shuts offAcroMed's
defense cost flow and places all claimants on the same plane, at the same time, with
respect to AcroMed's financial capacity to respond to all of the claims, leaving each
claimant[']s share to be determined by traditional application of equitable distribution
standards."); Silicone Gel Breast Implant, 1993 WL 795477, at *5 ("[T]he capture of these
assets in the proposed settlement for equitable distribution to all class members appears to be a fairer and superior alternative to the potential exhaustion of these assets
in continued litigation ...

.").

But see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.

Ct. 2295, 2313 (1999) ("[I]t is clear that the Advisory Committee did not contemplate
that the mandatory class action codified in subdivision (b) (1) (B) would be used to aggregate unliquidated tort claims on a limited fund rationale.").
21See OrtiZ, 119 S.C. at 2309 (noting that among "classic" limited fund class actions are suits by claimants to trust assets, bank accounts, and insurance proceeds).
See Richard L.Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80
CORNELL L.REv. 858, 880 (1995) ("[T]he limited fund theory would call for the inclusion of al claimants, whatever the source of their claims.").
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ner. Only the tort claims are compromised; the claims of other unse26
cured creditors and the interests of shareholders remain unaffected.
There may well be situations where it is fair to place the burden of
compromise only on the tort claimants when a limited fund class action settlement is approved. If the defendant's tort liability is as yet
scientifically unproven and still vigorously disputed, it may in fact be
the case. that the tort claimants are receiving more under the settlement than they would turn out to be entitled to receive if the claims
were litigated, even if they are receiving only a percentage of the
amount they initially claimed. Thus, it can be argued that the tort
claimants are not being treated inequitably in relation to the commercial creditors. Even when liability is well established, ajustification
for paying commercial creditors in full while the tort claimants are required to share a limited fund may be that full payment of such creditors is necessary for the continued operation of the business, which in
turn provides the basis for funding future pay-outs to the tort claimants.28

The advantage bankruptcy has to offer, even when full payment of
commercial claims may be in everyone's interest, is that all affected
groups have an opportunity to negotiate and vote on the appropriate
treatment of tort claimants, trade creditors, bond holders, shareholders, and the like.2 Thus the fairness of full payment of commercial

SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95

COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1458-59 (1995) (criticizing limited fund class action settlements,
pursuant to which "stock values soar, while tort creditors are either scaled back or
forced to rely on thinly funded or unspecified settlement funds"); Marcus, supra note
25, at 880 (emphasizing that limited fund class actions do not adjust the claims of all
creditors to the defendant's limited assets).
See Marcus, supra note 25, at 879 ("Plaintiff lawyers are notoriously and understandably generous in their prayers for relief, and these should not be taken as reliable
indicators of probable recovery.").
2 This was the rationale of the district court in OrthopedicBone Screw, 176 F.RD. at
177. In approving a Rule 23(b) (1) (B) class settlement, the court explained that the
settlementwas to be funded by "an outside infusion of $100 million of borrowed funds
not otherwise available except for the terms of the settlement." Id The court further
noted that "[w]ithout this infusion, the settlement cannot be accomplished and without the settlement, AcroMed will consume itself by exhausting all of its resources including its traditional borrowing potential." Id. Continued operation of the company
was therefore necessary to repay the loan taken out to fund the settlement to the tort
claimants.
2SSee 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (3) (1994) (authorizing creditors' committees to "participate in the formulation of a plan [and] advise those represented by such committee of
such committee's determinations as to any plan formulated"); id. § 1126(a) ("The
holder of a claim or interest allowed under section 502 of this title may accept or reject
a plan.").
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creditors is not just assumed or accepted unquestioningly, as it is in
the case of limited fund class action settlements. If such treatment is
provided for by a bankruptcy reorganization plan, it must either be
accepted by all classes of creditors and equity security holders, or substantive protections for non-accepting classes must be satisfied.8 0
Professor Resnick also points out the procedural advantages that
bankruptcy offers for aggregating mass tort claims against the bankruptcy debtor in a single forum and then for arriving at a global and
binding resolution of them. Among the features of bankruptcy that
he discusses are the automatic stay, the grant of exclusive jurisdiction
over the debtor's property, nationwide service of process, and the
bankruptcy court's authority to determine where personal injury and
wrongful death tort litigation will take place.3' These features of
bankruptcy are essential components of a system designed to achieve
a collective resolution of an ailing debtor's financial liabilities; one
court is able to bring a halt to individual collection efforts and to oversee the orderly liquidation or reorganization of the debtor for the
32
These same procedures and grants of
benefit of all creditors.
authority thus lend themselves naturally to the resolution of a large
group of tort claims asserted against a company.3 Indeed, the value
of these procedural tools for the resolution of mass torts is borne out
"' See Keene Corp. v. Fiorelli (In reJoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 14 F.3d 726,
732 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[C]lass members in [class action] cases such as this would have no
say in the conduct of the court-appointed class representatives and, unlike creditors in
bankruptcy, are not able to vote on a settlement. For them, it would be 'cram-down'
from start to finish." (citation omitted)).
3' See Resnick, supra note 4, Part I.B (discussing the advantages of nationwide jurisdiction, automatic stay, and other procedures when dealing with mass torts).
32 As one commentator has
stated:
This collective approach, when applied to the bankruptcy system, creates a
structure that precludes the creditors from individually chasing the debtor's
treasure (the available assets). Instead, the creditors work together to both
preserve and enhance the treasure and cut back on the costs of trying to recover a piece of it. The loss from the disaster (debtor nonpayment) is then
shared among the creditors.
KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM

137

(1997). See 3 COLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 362.03[2] (15th ed. 1999) ("Without the stay,
the debtor's assets might well be dismembered, and its business destroyed, before the
debtor has an opportunity to put forward a plan for future operations.... The stay

prevents this piecemeal liquidation, offering the chance to maximize the value of the
business.").

"See United States Lines, Inc. v. American S.S. Owners Mutual Protection &Indem. Ass'n (In reUnited States Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 641 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[A]s we
have previously pointed out, the bankruptcy court is the preferable venue in which to
handle mass tort actions involving claims against an insolvent debtor." (citingJoint E.
& S. Dist. Asbestos, 14 F.3d at 732)).
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by the extent to which the attempt has been made to incorporate similar procedures into mass tort class actions, effectively turning them
into "designer bankruptcies."4
If bankruptcy provides such an appropriate theoretical and procedural framework for addressing the situation facing a company
whose viability is threatened by mass tort litigation, one might wonder
why it has not become the mass tort solution of choice for such companies. Several practical obstacles stand in the way of bankruptcy's
becoming the darling of the mass tort world. Generally, lawyers other
than the ones who are engaged in litigating mass torts handle bankruptcies, 5 and, as a general rule, judges other than those who handle
mass tort litigation preside over bankruptcy cases.-6 While these rules
are not invariably true, 7 they are true frequently enough to create a
cultural divide that tort lawyers must traverse if a bankruptcy solution
is soughts Perhaps an even greater deterrent to seeking a bankruptcy
solution is the risk of displacement faced by those in a company who
would be the ones generally to make the decision to file for bankruptcy. In cases in which the value of the mass tort claims truly appears to exceed the value of the company, existing management is
faced with the very real possibility not only that they will lose their

34

Indeed, the [class action] process contemplated by Keene mirrors a bankruptcy proceeding. The finding of a limited fund corresponds to a finding of
insolvency. The preliminary injunction serves much the same function as the
automatic stay under Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The class representatives correspond to creditors' committees in Chapter 11 proceedings.
The proposed mandatory class settlement mirrors a reorganization plan and
'cram-down,' followed by a discharge.
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos, 14 F.3d at 732 (citations omitted); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98
CoLUM. L. REv. 1148, 1164 (1998) (describing Rule 23 (b) (1) (B) mass tort class actions as the "functional equivalent to bankruptcy").
See, e.g., REPORT ON MAss TORT LITGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 34 (noting
hiring of bankruptcy specialist as counsel to claimants' committee); RICHARD B.
SOBOL, BENDINGTHE LAW 69,74 (1991) (same).

3' See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994) (authorizing district courts to refer all bankruptcy
cases to bankruptcy courts).
3' See, eg., id. § 157(d) (authorizing district court "for cause shown" to withdraw a
case referred to bankruptcy court); Ackles v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.)
59 B.R. 99, 105-07 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Beard v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d
1029, 1031 (4th Cir. 1987) (withdrawing reference to bankruptcy court of most matters
in Dalkon Shield bankruptcy).
See, e.g., SOBOL, supra note 35, at 73 (observing that plaintiffs' attorneys in the
Dalkon Shield litigation were suspicious and felt outside their "natural habitat" when
the manufacturer filed for bankruptcy).
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jobs, 9 but also that the tort claimants will emerge from bankruptcy as

the owners of the reorganized company. Taking a step that may cause
the company to be turned over to its litigation adversaries is likely to
be considered only as a last resort.40 Finally, even from the viewpoint
of disinterested policymakers, bankruptcy has the disadvantage of taking a long time to arrive at a resolution, frequently four or more years
to reorganize a company facing mass tort liability.41 The long pen-

dency of the bankruptcy case in turn results in an even longer delay in
making payments to tort victimse and an ever escalating cost of
achieving a resolution.
Some of these obstacles are the inevitable result of enterprise-

threatening liability, but others are capable of being addressed
through procedural reforms.4 In either event, the harsh reality is that
9 See GROSS, supra note 32, at 32 ("[M]anagers of large financially troubled com-

panies are frequently replaced just before or during a large [bankruptcy] case."); Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, CorporateGovernancein the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 723 (1993) (finding that publicly held corporations undergoing Chapter 11 reorganizations experience a high rate
of CEO turnover).
' Cf REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 16 (noting
debtor's determination to retain control of the reorganized corporation); SOBOL, supra note 35, at 201-04 (noting Company's endorsement of the reorganization plan that
would enable management to retain control).
41 See REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supranote 2, app. C at 84-85 & nn.453-54
(noting that long delays have been "a major criticism" of bankruptcy as a mass tort
resolution tool).
4 See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the
Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 79, 155 (1997) (noting that
it took approximately nine years after the Robins plan was consummated and the trust
received full funding for all Dalkon Shield claims to be resolved).
4 Professor Resnick has identified a number of statutory gaps in the Bankruptcy
Code that need to be addressed if bankruptcy is to operate more effectively and on a
firmer legal footing as a mass tort resolution device. I agree with many of the proposed solutions. For example, because bankruptcy has been, and will be, pursued by
mass tort defendants that have sold products other than asbestos, see, e.g., Lindsey v.
O'Brien, Tanski, Tanzer & Young Health Care Providers of Conn. (In re Dow Coming
Corp.) 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996) (breast implants); In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R.
742 (E.D. Va. 1988), aftd, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (birth control devices), the
Bankruptcy Code needs to be amended to eliminate asbestos-specific mass tort authority and instead to provide generally for the resolution of mass torts, whatever the
source of the claims may be. Likewise, the status in bankruptcy of future claimants
needs to be statutorily clarified, although as I discuss below, due process considerations may limit how broadly the class of future claimants should be defined, see infra
note 97 and accompanying text. Finally, I agree with Professor Resnick's suggestions
for substantive amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would allow the subordination of punitive damages in mass tort bankruptcy reorganizations, the preconfirmation payment of mass tort claimants' emergency medical expenses, and the
protection of asset purchasers from successor liability.
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other options for collective resolution of mass tort claims may be disappearing, so bankruptcy, warts and all, may be a necessary choice for
some defendants. Attention needs to be given, therefore, to possible
constitutional objections to using bankruptcy to resolve all present
and future tort claims.
II. CONCERNS ABOUT BANKRUPTCYAS AMASS TORT VEHICLE
Professor Resnick cites, as one of bankruptcy's advantages, its
standard for classifying claims together that "is far less restrictive than
the four threshold requirements applicable to class actions under
Rule 23."44 As he points out, the Bankruptcy Code's only requirement
for grouping claims together in one class is that they be "substantially
similar,"" a requirement that courts have generally interpreted as
meaning that the claims have the same distribution rank against the
same property of the debtor.46 In that sense, all nonpriority, unsubordinated, unsecured claims are substantially similar and are permitted
to be grouped together in a single class in a reorganization plan. 7
Because of this flexibility in classifying unsecured claims, reorResnick, supra note 4, at 2060.
11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994) (providing that "a plan may place a claim or interest
in a particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other
claims or interests of such class").
4 See, e.g., In reAOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1150 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) ("[T]he focus of the classification is the legal character of the claim as it relates to the assets of the
debtor"); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 32, 1 1122.03[3] ("[T]he term 'substantially similar' must be construed to mean similar in legal character or effect as a
claim against the debtor's assets or as an interest in the debtor."); id. [ 1122.03[4]
("Claims of the same kind and the same rank involving the same property may be included within a single class.");John C. Anderson, Classificationof Claims and Interests in
ReorganizationCases Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 101 (1984)
("As a general rule, all creditors with equal rank and with claims against the same
property are usually placed in the same class .... ").

But see Teamsters Nat'l Freight

Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.) 800 F.2d 581, 58487 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's conclusion that, because of the union's
unique noncreditor interests, its unsecured claim was not substantially similar to other
unsecured claims).
47 See In re Eisenbarth, 77 B.R. 228, 236 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) ("An unsecured
claim is simply that, an unsecured claim. No valid reason exists for treating the unsecured claims of [certain institutional creditors] different than the unsecured claims of
the trade creditors."); Anderson, supra note 46, at 119 (stating that generally "the unsecured creditors will be placed in the same class and receive the same treatment");
Peter E. Meltzer, Disenfranchisingthe Dissenting CreditorThrough Artificial Classficationor
ArificialImpaiment 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281, 290 (1992) ("'Unsecured claims will, generally speaking, comprise one class, whether trade, tort, publicly held debt or a deficiency of a secured creditor.'" (quoting 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., BANKRuPTcYLAW
& PRACTIcE § 60.05, at 7 (1991))).
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ganization plans in mass tort bankruptcies frequently place all of the
tort claims together in a single class, regardless of the nature of the

injury, the existence of issues unique to certain claimants, the varying
degrees of legal strength of the claims, or the extent to which injury
has been manifested.48 If such a classification scheme satisfies not only
statutory requirements but also passes constitutional muster, then Professor Resnick may be correct in suggesting that bankruptcy offers an

advantage in its ability to consolidate claims. The concerns raised after Amchem and Ortiz about the possible need for an unwieldy number
of class action subclasses of mass tort claimants
utilizing bankruptcy's one-class grouping.50

could be alleviated by

Before accepting the argument that bankruptcy offers an advantage in this regard, however, one must determine why bankruptcy is
permitted greater flexibility in classification than class actions possess.
Perhaps the answer is simply that Rule 23 imposes certain express requirements for class certification that the Bankruptcy Code just does
not impose on Chapter 11 plan classification. For all class actions,
"the claims ...of the representative parties [must be] typical of the
claims.., of the class""' and "the representative parties [must] fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class." 2 For 23(b) (3) class
actions, specifically, "the questions of law or fact common to the

48

See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 697 (referring to the class of Dalkon

Shield claimants as one "with so many various unliquidated personal injury claims
which vary so much in the extent and nature of injury, medical evidence and causation
factors" as to render it nearly impossible to provide specific estimates of recovery);
UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 271 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (describing class of asbestos claimants in UNR reorganization plan as including "asbestos victims who know they have claims against UNR.... [and] those who
may have been exposed to UNR's asbestos products before the bankruptcy, before
confirmation, or after confirmation, but do not yet have an injury or know they have
an injury"); REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 34 (describing
class 17 of Eagle-Picher reorganization plan as consisting of "all present and future
rights to payment for death, bodily injury, or other personal damages resulting from
exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products, or from products containing
lead chemicals, manufactured or distributed by the debtor prior to the bankruptcy petition date").
49 See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text (suggesting that sub-classes
are necessary for a class involving all mass tort victims to be certified).
" See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 634, 655-56 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999)
(rejecting argument that more valuable, multi-rupture breast implant claims are not
substantially similar to single rupture claims and thus must be separately classified); id.
at 658 ("[A]Il breast-implant claims, both domestic and foreign, are substantially similar.").
51FED. R. CiV. P. 23(a) (3).
52 FED. . IQ. P. 23(a) (4).
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members of the class [must] predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members." 3 The Bankruptcy Code, by contrast, only
requires substantial similarity.
Stating the differences in the requirements, however, merely begs the question why typicality, adequacy of representation, and predominance are concerns of class actions and not also of bankruptcy.ss
The Supreme Court's opinions in Amchem and Ortiz, while not
models of clarity, do provide some insights into the basis for the
Court's concerns about proper classification of mass tort claimants involved in class action settlements. In both cases, the Court's holding
that the certification and approval of the class action settlement was
invalid rested squarely on the Court's interpretation of Rule 23.m To
the extent that the decisions interpret Rule 23, they do not apply to
questions about the proper classification of tort claimants in bankruptcy reorganization plans under the Bankruptcy Code.
Going beyond the actual holdings of Amchem and 7tiz, however,
one sees suggestions of broader due process and fairness concerns
animating the Court's reasoning. For example, in Amchem, Justice
Ginsburg explained on several occasions that the certification requirements of Rule 23 (a) and (b) are designed to focus the certifying
court's attention on whether the proposed class is "sufficiently cohesive" to permit representational litigation, thus allowing a departure
from the usual rule that only parties to a lawsuit may be bound by its
57
judgment.
In other words, because class actions constitute an excepBfED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (3).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994) (providing that "a plan may place a claim or an
interest in a particular class only if such claim is substantially similarto the other claims
or interests of such class" (emphasis added)).
"' See Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy Courts
Direct Tort Reform?, 76 MEx. L. REV. 1695, 1713 (1998) ("[Olne must ask what unique
bankruptcy standards warrant replacing the essential Rule 23 'class-qualifying criteria'
of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation." (quoting Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997))).
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 2322 (1999) ("The
nub of our position is that we are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon its
adoption, and that we are not free to alter it except through the process prescribed by
Congress in the Rules Enabling Act."); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628 ("[We have concluded
that the class in this case cannot satisfy [Rule 23's] requirements of common issue
predominance and adequacy of representation....").
57 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623 ("The Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance inquiry tests
whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation."); see also id. at 621 ("Subdivisions (a) and (b) focus court attention on whether
a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by
decisions of class representatives."); id. at 626 n.20 (noting the overlap of the adequacy
of representation, commonality, and typicality requirements and explaining that they
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tion to the general due process requirement that everyone be afforded her own day in court, the rule makers imposed requirements,
which the Court applies strictly, designed to confine the certification
of classes to those situations in which there is a sufficient identity of
interest between class members and their representatives that the class
members' rights may be fairly adjudicated in their absence.s Sinilarly, Ortiz reflects the Court's underlying concern about the due process implications of imposing a binding resolution of claims on absent
parties without strict insistence on the absence of conflicts of interest
between class members and those purporting to represent them.
Amchem and Ortiz thus suggest that the Constitution, not just the
current version of Rule 23, prohibits the certification of broadly defined settlement classes of tort claimants with varying and potentially
conflicting interests. If so, the reasoning of these decisions would also
seem to apply to classifications in bankruptcy. The Court in Ortiz,
however, distinguished bankruptcy from the class action context then
before it. After discussing the general rule that persons not joined as
parties may not be bound by the results of a lawsuit, the Court cited
(in addition to representational litigation) bankruptcy as an example
of an exceptional situation involving a "'special remedial scheme'"
that permissibly "'foreclos[es] successive litigation by nonlitigants."'"
Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court referred to the "protections for

all "'serve as guideposts for determining whether... maintenance of a class action is

economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in
their absence'" (quoting General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58
n.13 (1982))).
-"See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 805
(1997) (discussing the various ways in which class actions represent "a clear departure
from the premise that no one should be bound to ajudgment in personam absent the
personal security offered by notice and a full opportunity to participate in the underlying litigation").
59 See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2315 (discussing the "inherent tension between represen-

tative suits and the day-in-court ideal" and noting that the tension is increased in a
mandatory class settlement because "[ t] he legal rights of absent class members... are
resolved regardless either of their consent, or, in a class with objectors, their express
wish to the contrary"); see also Issacharoff, supra note 58, at 822 (discussing concerns
about mandatory class settlements in which "there is no capacity to refuse courtappointed representation" and "the individual class member is presented with what
purports to be a bindingfait accompli4 with the only recourse a likely futile objection at
the fairness hearing required by Rule 23(e)").

SOrtiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2315 (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2, in which
the Court noted that bankruptcy and probate are examples of "legal proceedings
[that] may terminate pre-existing rights [of nonlitigants] if the scheme is otherwise
consistent with due process").
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creditors built into the Bankruptcy Code."61 These protections are in
apparent contrast to the lack of "'structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected,'"
which the Court found fatal to the settlement classes presented by
both Ortiz and Amchem 6 2 Thus, the Court's view may be that bankruptcy differs from class actions in significant respects that render inapplicable the strict classification requirements that due process may
otherwise require for class action certification.s6
If bankruptcy is distinguishable, it must be because of the procedural and substantive protections it affords creditors-protections that
are unavailable to absent class members when a class action is certified. In mass tort class actions, the Court's expressed concern is that
the personal injury claims of class members are being compromised
without their direct consent by persons designated to represent
them.6 The only protection for class members, other than the opportunity in some cases to opt outO and the requirement that the court
approve the settlement,6 is the insistence that the representatives
share and competently represent their interests. While bankruptcy
61

[I]t is worth noting that if limited fund certification is allowed in a situation
where a company provides only a de minimis contribution to the ultimate settlement fund, the incentives such a resolution would provide to companies
facing tort liability to engineer settlements similar to the one negotiated in
this case would, in all likelihood, significantly undermine the protections for
creditors built into the Bankruptcy Code.
Id. at 2321 n.34.
62 Id, at 2319 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at
627).
It should be noted, however, that although the Court in Amdhem distinguished
limited fund class actions from the opt-out class action then before it, see 521 U.S. at
623 n.19, it later imposed similarly strict certification requirements on that type of class
action, see Oft/z, 119 S. Ct. at 2319-21.
" See id. at 2314-15 (discussing due process concerns with respect to mandatory
class action settlements); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626-27 (discussing need for protection of
absent class members' interests by means of representation for homogeneous subgroups).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2)-(3) (providing for an opt-out right in the case of a
Rule 23(b) (3) class action).
66 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court... .").
67 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626 n.20, which states:
The adequacy-of-representation requirement "tend[s] to merge" with the
commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 23(a), which "serve as guideposts
for determining.., whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims
are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and
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also permits some creditors to represent the interests of others,s6 these
representatives, by contrast, do not have the final say. An appointed
creditors' committee is primarily a negotiating agent.0 Once a reorganization plan is devised, even one supported by the committee, it
must be sent out for voting by the creditors and interest holders. 70

Thus, each identifiable creditor whose claim is impaired is given the
opportunity to express his or her approval or disapproval of the proposed resolution. 7' Although the Bankruptcy Code does not require
unanimity,n it guarantees dissenting creditors in an accepting class a
minimum level of paymentO3 Furthermore, if the preference of a class
adequately protected in their absence." The adequacy heading also factors in
competency and conflicts of class counsel.
Id. (quoting General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 n.13) (citation omitted). Moore'sFederalPracticeobserves that:
This "adequacy of representation" requirement was designed to protect the
due process rights of absent class members.... Because the judgment in a
class action has resjudicata implications ... for the absent class members, due
process requires that the interests of absent members be adequately represented by the class members who are parties to the action.
5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

§

23.25[1] (3d ed. 1996)

(footnotes omitted).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1994) (requiring that a United States trustee appoint an
unsecured creditors' committee except in small business bankruptcy cases).
69 See, e.g., DAvID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTcy § 10-11 (1993) ("The principal
role of the committee is to speak and negotiate for the larger group which it represents."); TABB, supranote 20, at 67 ("The committee plays a particularly important role
in the formulation and confirmation of a reorganization plan. The committee negotiates directly with the debtor.., over the terms of a plan on behalf of the class of creditors or equity holders represented."); Marjorie L. Girth, Rethinking Fairness in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 466 (1999) ("[N]egotiations with the goal of
proposing a successful reorganization plan are usually carried out between the
debtor's representatives and those representing the creditors' committee.").
70 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (1994) ("The holder of a claim or interest allowed under
section 502 of this title may accept or reject a plan."); id. § 1129(a) (7), (b) (mandating
that for a plan to be confirmed, either all impaired classes must accept it, or the plan
must satisfy "cram down" requirements).
71 If a class of claims or interests is not impaired under the plan, the members
of
that class "are conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan," and they need not be
given an opportunity to vote. 1d. § 1126(f).
7 See id. § 1126(c) ("A class of claims has accepted a plan if such
plan has been accepted by creditors.., that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half
in number of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors... that have accepted
or rejected such plan.").
See id. § 1129(a) (7) (stating that each creditor must either accept the plan or
"receive or retain under the plan... property of a value, as of the effective date of the
plan, that is not less than the amount that such [creditor] would so receive or retain if
the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date"). This guarantee
of receipt in Chapter 11 of at least the amount of the liquidation dividend is known as
the "best interests of creditors" or simply the "best interests" test. See TABB, supranote
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of creditors as a whole is overridden and the plan is crammed down
on them, the Code assures them fair treatment in relation to the other
classes of creditors and interest holders.7 4 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code
contains a package of protections-both procedural and substantivefor the creditors who do not participate directly in the proceedings by
serving on a creditors' committee. 75
Although these built-in protections may be sufficient to satisfy due
process concerns in traditional bankruptcy cases,7 6 the complexities
and innovations usually found in mass tort bankruptcies may render
these protections less effective in that context. For example, a bankruptcy class of tort claimants may consist of hundreds of thousands of
persons with a variety of injuries, whether manifested or merely poten-

20, at 841 ("The best interests test of § 1129(a) (7) is intended to provide a floor of
protection for dissenting members of a class.").
74 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1) (1994) (stating that to be confirmed by cram-down
method, a plan must not "discriminate unfairly" and must be "fair and equitable" with
respect to each impaired class that has not accepted the plan). In the case of a class of
unsecured creditors, the fair and equitable test incorporates the absolute priority rule
pursuant to which no creditors or security interest holders junior to the class of unsecured creditors may receive any property under the plan if the unsecured creditors are
notpaidinfull. See id. at § 1129(b)(2)(B).
75 Because of the opportunity for direct voting in bankruptcy, the need for precise
definition of classes to eliminate all conflicts of interest is arguably lessened. Claimants
are permitted to speak for themselves, rather than having decisions made for them by
representatives. Because some claimants can be outvoted, however, the Bankruptcy
Code provides substantive protections to assure fair treatment. See id. § 1129(a) (7),
(b). The Court in Amchem held that a court's approval of a class action settlement as
fair cannot substitute for satisfaction of the class certification requirements. See
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) (stating that Rule 23(e)'s
"prescription was designed to function as an additional requirement, not as a superseding direction, for the 'class action' to which Rule 23(e) refers is one qualified for
certification under Rule 23(a) and (b)"). Likewise, in bankruptcy the substantive protections of the best interests test and the absolute priority rule do not supersede the
voting and classification requirements. Both aspects, procedural and substantive, are
necessary to protect creditors' interests.
76 See In re Dow Coming Corp., 244 B.R. 634, 665
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999)
("[O]ne of Congress' primary motivations for limiting class membership to substantially similar claims was... to ensure 'that the votes cast by the class will reflect the
joint interests of the class.'" (quoting In re Huckabee Auto Co., 33 B.R. 141, 148
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981))); William Blair, Classificationof Unsecured Claims in Chapter11
Reorganization, 58 AM. BANKR. LJ. 197, 228 (1984) ("The chapter 11 rehabilitation objectives assume that negotiation accomplished through democratic decision-making
will provide fair treatment if the distribution remains within the parameters of the confirmation requirements." (footnote omitted)). Cf Meltzer, supra note 47, at 299 ("I
contend that a lender's deficiency claim is substantially similar to trade claims, and
that, notwithstanding any potential conflicts of interest, the only appropriate interpretation of the Code is to prohibit separate classification of the creditors holding those
claims.").
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tial, and with claims of varying degrees of legal strength. 7 In a class
action context, these differences would require the creation of subclasses with independent representation." My concern is that in this
bankruptcy context, the ability of all members of the class to vote on
the plan may not sufficiently ensure that the voices of each distinct
subgroup will be adequately heard. 7' A distinct minority-for example, those tort claimants with especially serious injuries and strong
cases-might get outvoted by a large number of holders of small
claims who favor a quick pay-out of relatively small amounts with little
proof required. s Thus, the class as a whole may support a plan that
provides for quick pay-outs and puts significant disincentives in the
way of achieving more substantial payments, a result not in the interests of the larger tort claimants included in the class!' This possibility
is made all the more likely by the frequent practice in mass tort bankruptcies of valuing all claims for voting purposes at one dollar in order
to avoid the necessity of individually liquidating each of the thousands
of tort claims.82 This practice mutes the voice of large tort claimants
See, e.g., In reA.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 697 (4th Cir. 1989) (describing class
of Dalkon Shield claimants as consisting of approximately 195,000 unliquidated personal injury claims); REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 84
(describing the class of asbestos personal injury claims in the Eagle-Picher bankruptcy
as consisting of approximately 162,000 claims).
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2319-20 (1999)
(holding that the differences between present and future claimants, and between
those possessing more valuable claims because of potential insurance coverage and
those without that possibility, require separate subclasses for each distinct group).
79 See Bruce A. Markell, Clueless on Classification: Toward RmovingArtifcialLimits on
Chapter 11 Classification, 11 BANKR. D~y. J. 1, 12-13 (1995) ("Behind the assumption
that voting is meaningful lies the notion that some common interest exists among the
members of a class. Otherwise, it makes little sense to say that anything less than a
unanimous vote could bind dissenters."); id. at 16 ("[A] plan proponent has the opportunity, under the right circumstances, to overwhelm objecting parties by including
them in a class filled with sympathetic creditors.").
8o Cf In re Dow Coming Corp., 244 B.R. at 665 (rejecting the argument that a discrete subgroup within a class of physician claimants was disenfranchised by classification together with a larger group of physician claimants having different interests; so
long as the claims are substantially similar, "assertions of attempted vote gerrymandering are simply irrelevant").
81See SOBOL, supranote 35, at 328 (arguing that the vote of the class of the Dalkon
Shield claimants was "lopsided" because 94% of the total voting stength would not
have filed claims outside of bankruptcy or had only minor injuries, while 6% had substantial claims); Vairo, supranote 42, at 134-36 (describing various pay-out options under Robins trust, with quickestpayouts being for low value claims).
'2 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 697 ("[F] or purposes of voting, each
Dalkon Shield Claim was estimated and allowed to be equal."); Kane v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 646 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he Bankruptcy Court... 'allowed' [asbestos personal injury] claims for voting purposes in the arbitrary amount of one dol-
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in the voting process.
Once a subgroup of tort claimants is outvoted, the substantive
guarantee of the best interests test might provide little protection. In
a bankruptcy involving tort claims that have been estimated to amount
to hundreds of millions or billions of dollars-an amount frequently
far in excess of the value of the company-the court may quickly conclude that the tort claimants as a whole will receive more under the
reorganization plan's trust than they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation.84 No comparison will be made between the amount a particular
dissenting tort claimant will receive under the plan and the liquidaton dividend he or she would receive in Chapter 7,8 since most tort
claims will not have been individually valued at this stage. It is possible, therefore, that the outvoted large tort claimants will not actually
receive as much as the Bankruptcy Code supposedly guarantees them.
The inclusion of future claimants within the bankruptcy further
complicates the effectiveness of bankruptcy's built-in protections for
mass tort claimants. Professor Resnick addresses some of the resulting
concerns by endorsing the Bankruptcy Review Commission's proposal
for the appointment of a legal representative for future mass tort
claimants.
This recommendation would provide firmer statutory
authority for the practice that has been followed in a number of mass
tort bankruptcies. 7 Providing a separate legal representative for the
lar...." (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994))); REPORT ON MASS TORT LITGATION,
supra note 2, app. E at 30 ("When it came time to tabulate the votes, each asbestos personal injury and property damages claim, as well as each lead personal injury claim,
would be valued at $1.00.").
a3 See, eg., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 699 (noting that the district court valued Dalkon Shield claims at $2.475 billion); REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra
note 2, app. E at 30 (noting that the bankruptcy court estimated present and future
asbestos claims at $2.5 billion; as a result of a compromise with the unsecured creditors' committee, the valuation was reduced to $2 billion).
See, e.g., In reA.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 698-700 (indicating that the Fourth Circuit rejects a challenge to the confirmation of the Robins reorganization plan based on
the best interests test, and examining only the basis for the district court's estimation
of value of Dalkon Shield claims); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 275
(S.D. Ohio 1996) (concluding, with little discussion, that given the inclusion of future
asbestos claims within the bankruptcy proceeding, the best interests test is satisfied);
SOBOL, supra note 35, at 238-43 (criticizing application of the best interests test in Robins bankruptcy).
u See, e.g., sources cited supra note 73 (explaining the best interests test).
6 See Resnick, sura note 4, Part II.B
8 See, e.g., In reA.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 744 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988),affd, 880
F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (listing a "Future Claimants' Representative" among the "official committees" appointed in the case); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 46 B.R. 671, 674
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (authorizing appointment of a legal representative for "putative
asbestos disease victims"); REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at
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future claimants also addresses the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Amchem and Ortiz about the inadequacy of representation due to conflicts of interest between claimants with present injuries and those whose injuries have not yet manifested.8 Experience to
date shows that future claims' representatives can provide an independent voice for the interests of the unknown future claimants. This
independent voice counterbalances the advocacy by other creditors'
committees, including any tort claimants' committee that is appointed
and that might be presumed primarily to represent the interests of
present claimants. 9
Although the conflict of interest problem can be reduced by the
participation of a future claims' representative, other concerns remain. Most future claimants are unable to participate directly in the
bankruptcy case because their identities will not be known until some
future, post-bankruptcy date. Thus, even if the rights of present tort
claimants are adequately protected by their opportunity to vote to accept or reject the reorganization plan and by the provision of substantive protections for them if they are outvoted, future claimants' rights
are exclusively in the hands of their representative. That representative will not only negotiate on the future claimants' behalf, but she will
also vote on the plan for them and will raise any objections to confirmation on their behalf.9 In this instance bankruptcy becomes a representational suit, like a class action, rather than a special remedial
scheme with its own built-in protections. Any statutory authorization
for the appointment of a future claims' representative therefore needs
to take account of the due process and fairness concerns raised with
respect to binding absent parties to the results of representational
39 (discussing appointment of a "legal representative for future personal injury and
property damage claimants" in asbestos bankruptcy).
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2319-20 (1999) ("[I]t
is obvious after Amchem that a class divided between holders of present and future
claims (some of the latter involving no physical injury and to claimants not yet born)
requires subdivision into homogeneous subclasses .... with separate representation to
eliminate conflicting interests of counsel."); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 626 (1997) ("[Flor the currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate

payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an
ample, inflation-protected fund for the future.").
"9 See, e.g., REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 39-40 (discussing independent role played by future claims' representative in asbestos bankruptcy); SOBOL, supra note 35, at 222-23 (discussing future claims' representative's op-

position to reorganization plans that did not adequately protect the rights of future
Dalkon Shield claimants).
'o See, e.g., NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANxRUpTCy: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARS 32930 (1997) (recommending the appointment of a mass future claims representative).
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suits,9' even if bankruptcy generally is freed of those requirements.
While the Bankruptcy Review Commission wisely suggests that some
mass tort bankruptcies may require the appointment of multiple fature claims' representatives,92 the experience to date has been that
only one person is appointed to represent all future tort claimants in
the case. a Amchem and Ortiz cast doubt on the legitimacy of such a
monolithic representation of future claimants.
Professor Resnick and other commentators have argued that the
appointment of a future claims' representative, coupled with the provision of constructive notice, will satisfy any procedural due process
concerns about the inclusion of future claimants in a mass tort bankruptcy.9 Professor Resnick himself notes, however, that the Supreme
Court in Amchem raised questions about the efficacy of notice to persons who "may not even know of their exposure, or realize the extent
of the harm they may incur."95 Although the Court found no need to
rule definitively on this point, it did pointedly question whether "notice sufficient under the Constitution ... could ever be given to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous.9 5 Given that statement,
one might question whether the Supreme Court will view constructive
notice as providing much protection for future claimants in bankruptcy.97 If not, the Court may be unwilling to allow future claimants

9' SeeJones, supra note 55, at 1722 ("[A] collective remedy is a collective remedy,
whether enforced in a class action or bankruptcy, and the criteria necessary to protect
absentee class members' rights should not in principle vary depending on the forum.").
92 SeeNATIONAL BANKiR REVIEW COMM'N, suranote 90, at 332 ("Each class of mass
future claimholders would be entitled to its own representative, as the interests of the
classes of mass future claims may be adverse to one another.").
93 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 87 (listing cases in which a single individual was
appointed to represent the interests of future tort claimants).
See Resnick, supra note 4, Part II.B (noting how appointment of a future claimants' representative and constructive notice meets any due process concerns); see also
Kathryn R. Heidt, Future Claims in Bankruptcy: The NBC Amendments Do Not Go Far

Enough, 69 AM. BANIR. L.J. 515, 515 (1995) ("Any due process problems resulting from
insufficient notice or knowledge can be addressed by appointing a representative for
the future claimants and establishing a fund to pay the claimants as their claims become fixed."); Ralph R. Mabey &Jamie Andra Gavrin, ConstitutionalLimitations on the
Discharge of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 745, 781 (1993)
("The... mandate of Mullane therefore usually requires the opportunity for future
claimants to be heard through a representative when publication notice to them is
largely futile.").
95Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
96 Id.
9 An argument can be made that in many bankruptcy cases, effective notice can be
given to persons who are in the population of those expected to incur claims against
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to be bound by a reorganization plan confirmed in a bankruptcy case
in which their interests were litigated by an appointed representative

unless great care was given to ensuring the absence of conflicting interests within the group represented by each future claims' representative.
CONCLUSION

Professor Resnick has stated well the advantages of utilizing bankruptcy as a vehicle for resolving mass torts. Bankruptcy has many procedural and conceptual features that can be applied to permit a resolution of all of the claims facing a beleaguered mass tort defendant.
My enthusiasm for a bankruptcy solution, however, is tempered by the
recognition of the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in other
mass tort contexts about forcing a judicial resolution on claimants
who are not active participants in the lawsuit leading to the global solution. Perhaps bankruptcy is sufficiently distinguishable from class
actions that the Supreme Court will eventually approve it as a mass
tort device. As other options disappear or become less attractive, it
may become one of the few remaining possibilities. To date, however,
the Court has not shown itself to be pragmatic in its approach to the
judicial resolution of mass torts. 8 As a result, although a bankruptcy
the debtor in the future. In the asbestos bankruptcies, for example, extensive efforts
have been made to provide notice by means of publications directed at unions and organizations of workers in industries that involved exposure to asbestos, as well as notice
to attorneys handling such cases and widespread notice in general circulation publications. See, e.g., REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 2, app. E at 42 (describing extensive notice of bar date given in Eagle-Picher bankruptcy).
Although such announcements may be ignored by many who presently suffer no
illness, perhaps it is reasonable to expect that enough persons who know that they
have been exposed to asbestos will see the notices that the actions of the future claims'
representative can thereby be effectively monitored. Moreover, when these future
claimants' injuries do manifest themselves, they will still have the opportunity to liquidate their claims pursuant to the trust or administrative mechanism that is established
under the reorganization plan. Even if the "practicalities and peculiarities" of a mass
tort bankruptcy case, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950), justify the provision of constructive notice to such future claimants, I fear that
it pushes the limits of due process too far to include within the group of future claimants persons who, at the time of bankruptcy, have not been exposed to the offending
product. It cannot even be pretended that someone who has not yet purchased, used,
or come in contact with a product that precipitates a mass tort bankruptcy will have
any reason to understand that the bankruptcy might affect her rights.
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2325 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting):
I cannot easily find a legal answer to the problems this case raises by referring,
as does the majority, to "our deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone
should have his own day in court." Instead, in these circumstances, I believe
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believer, I remain chary about predicting the ultimate triumph of
bankruptcy as a mass tort vehicle.

our Court should allow a district court full authority to exercise every bit of
discretionary power that the law provides.
Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted); see also Awhe ,z521 U.S. at 629 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("I believe that the need for settlement in this mass tort case, with hundreds of thousands of lawsuits, is greater than the Court's opinion suggests.").
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